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IN TP.E SUPREI1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

r'Rl:J:::O JOES,

INC., a Utah
cr-rpora tion, DONALD VAUGHN
·;oL'F'N and JOAW•lA TOL1·1Atl,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

v.

Case No. 14,515

:OLLIS Y. P!::?.'{, GORDO~; 1-l.i'.LL
nd KENi'lETl'l HOSTETTER,

DefencantsRespondents~

BRIE? OF

PL1\IKTIFFS-.~'~.PPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for dagages arising out of the forcible
e1try of the plaintiffs'

Ellis Peay.

leased prer;1.ises by the lessor, defendant

It is also an action for conversion of the personal

crop'"rty •..1hich was located in the building on the leased premises.
~e

conversion claim was made against all of the defendants.

Defen-

61nt Peay counter-claimed for rent allegedly due and unpaid.
D2~endants

Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed against the plaintiff

ac': cross-claimed agai:1st defendant Peay to quiet title to the
~rsonal
2 hi~·2d

property in question.

Hall and Hostetter also cross-

ao3.inst Peay for indeEmification in the event any judgment

:h:J'Jld be entered a]ainst ther'1.

DISPOSITIUN I:: THE LO\·IER COURT
?he trial court, Judge J.
'I

::i th p-rcj

uc~ice

Robert Bullock, presiding, dismissed

e_;:ct..:pt. that it entered judgment for
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1'

-~

and e!lc:c:: jrJd<;rc:.c;tt c-<S-'-i:;st the
8nt..:~-T

for tL-2 forci:J:::::

l.J·.r

t~12

dcf~:nrL1nts
cJctc~ndant

in the cnnunt prayen

l'eCly und

fo:- th2

~,:ror,

rent reduced fr2m $1?5),00 to $:i54.8C1 -,s reflr:>ctivc o{' the crc(r":past

rent.

c·_:~_,

I:1

th~:

t-.he t:-ia.l

?t] ~.:-::-:tati-;·.~,

C0 1J:!:-c

cost3 of this

,_.,'ith

a~Jpel.l,J.:-:t.~

r-:::::;a~d

o_:.;k

\.hat

tl~

t.s Coc1c-= re\'2: .-

·to the forcible sntry a:H1 co::\r_::_·sl:

a~peal.

5":',\TLc·lENT OF Fi\CT3

I:1 late Deccrr_:_,er of 1974, DorHld and
all of th~ i:tte~est in F.::-isco Joe's,
sole
Utah,

?~C~.-.ivit}
~hich

~-1:iS

Inc.,

bs:.<: .:::.he ma:nageJr,·'3Pt of a

bore the

na~e

of the

__r ,111 1 j .J..C I '

a

ToLcktn purchioc

corz)orat:.:io~ ',·l:tJ.:t

T'E'stc)_:J:-~:1:

in

cor~oration.

:•_1.:;:;

- 0./,

~fo'lnncc

l'J I 1-

of

tlt
,-,_-, lc
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PrJ1.'J,

l!!S~

provided that Tolman would pay $400.00 per month rent,

~ginning

on January 1, 1975.

The provisions of the lease provide

that a five day notice-to-quit may be given if the rent is more
~an

fifteen days delinquent.

The lease also provided for a

$450.00 payment on March 15, 1975, as a deposit for the last

ronth's rent.
~~e

Tolman made the January rent payment but did not

the February or March payments.
Because the business was unprofitable, Tolman closed it and

b:gan looking for a purchaser with the help of a real estate
~ency.
~~.

On

~arch

5, 1976, Tolman had a discussion with defendant

the contents of which are discuted.

In any event, Tolman

conti:1u2d in pe3ce ful possession of the premises until c·!arch 12,
1975.
mm~

On that dat'c:, Peay entered the premises and had a locksmith
to change the locks on the building, thus excluding the

plaintiff from possession of the premises and the personal property
•.;ithin the building.

Peay alleges that the lock-chainging was

cione for the purposes of security but never explains the failure
~provide

the plaintiffs with a key to the premises.

Respondents Hall and Hostetter subsequently leased the
premises fro;c defendant Peay and purportedly entered into a
~rchase

contract for the personal property.

In early April of

1975, plaintiff Tolman informed both Hall and Hostetter that he
~Mci

the personal property in the restaurant.

They responded by

that they had purchased it from Peay and that Tolman
·~'JL:

h.:cvc co solve an:,: problems with him (Peay).
The defendants have never returned any of the personal
rty belanging to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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c':ltoO~l.tion

Appellants'

on appeal is that th,:c trial court

erred o.s a mati:.er o:' lo:.., in failing t0 find that the abo·:e fac:s
consti tnted forci~lc c'r:try by the defendant Prcily emu convcersior.

bv all of the defendants.

Appellan~s

believe that the Utah lH

on these two subjects is clear and that the trial court vras
sir:'.?lY incorrect in its holding.
POIN'l.' I
THE TRII\L CO\Jl'.'I ERi,ED IN FAILElG TO FI:-JD Ilii\T TUE DSFENDA':
PE_:\Y \•JAS GUIL'.LY OF FORCIBLY ECJTRY.

by the clear

~eight

of

the evidence

~~

trial.

·j,he evidence

sho·,;ed that respondent Ellis Peay took possession of the leas'•'

prop{;2r_·ty ,,.,;it"hout the app2llants •

pc~rl.issio:t

or: :.·;rithout follmtir,:

the legal requirements of Utah's t,orc ible En try and Detainer i•
U.C.C\.

§

78-JS-l,

et seq.

Appellants belie•1e that the error

CODiJlaincd ·.Jf in this appeal occurred in applying the pertinen:,
la':.' to the £acts in thls case.
U'cah J ,C.'d has clearly defined the metho:l by \·lhich a landlc::•

~ay dispossess a tenant whom he believes to be in arrears oo~,
rent payments.

As stated in

States \·Jholesale Suppl,,,

Fr2e't~ay Park Building, Inc.

22 U.2d 266,

"forcible entry and detainer statute

fully is in possession of land."
45 P.2d 903, 906

(1935)

451 P.2d 778
(§

(1969), the

78-36-3, U.C.A., 195li

Paxto"1 '-'·

Fish2r, 86 OtJh ;,

estatlish0d that the ~orcible

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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v3

surr~nde~

of possession by the tenant:

Even rishtful owners should not take the law into
th•ir own hands a~d proceed to recover oossession by
violence, or by entry in the nighttime,.or durin~ the
absence of the occupants ot any real property.
3ven contractual p:-ovisions between the parties do not over..

-~

~je

requirements of ?roceeding in a court of law.

"i:-:--, 3 Utah2d 419,
:~2

285 P.2d 114,

(1955)

the lease under which

ca3e arose contained a provision giving the landlord the right

J': rc:-c'1try upon the tenant's default in rent payr.ent •11ithout

The court held that the landlord
:J.~::! ~till

not dis]Jossess the tenant without his ez;J:cess perr.tission:

~teh

has enacted Forcible Entry and

Stat~tcs

and

~

landlord

rna~'

not

Detai~er

~~ithout

the ex?=ess

co:.coent cf a te:1ant repossess his prope.ct:,· 1-1i thout
resorting to re2edies provided in those statutes.
Id, at 1118.
?e-2:-sen ''· Platt, 16 Utah2d 330, 400 P.2d 507

(1965), the

: "l~ -... ;,s stated eveu more clearly in the court's holding that

cisCJ::J:;session, unless consentual, must be effected by the statutory

·se.::s.

2'hat case, 1-;hich is almost exactly indentical to this

:cc, c:eacly shOi·ls that

t~e

defendant, Peay, \vas guilty of Vlrong-

:cl 2:,':~1· '-"hen he entered the premises, had the locks changed,
•cc: '::c:::~ ~Jossession •.vi thout permission.

:·,ic:,

The law of the case,

·.:o.s ovcerlooked by the trial court in this case, is clearly

Our orevious decisions construing our forcible
entr~ and detainer statute place a duty on a
p~-s~n whether entitled to the real property in
DL!estion oc no~, to not use force or stealth or
f~a~d in ohtai'1i~g possession of such realty.
s~c~

foccibl2

~~try

and detainer statute

c~o~te3 a rig~t in a perso~ who is in actual
~ea~cablc possession of such real ?roperty_to a
c~
n
o~ actio~ e~alnst a person who, 1n h1s
ab3~ncu,
andLaw~tth~ut
process,
by fo:-ce,
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding legal
for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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stealth or fraud, takes the ?ossession of such
property from him.
Id, at 400 P.2d 508.
Despite the atter:1;:>ts at trial to justify Peay's behavior, it is
crystal clear under Utah law that the acts of the defendant ~~.
in dispossessing the plaintiffs of the leased premises, constituto.
forcible entry as defined in Utah statute and case law.
As seen by the Delaware Court in
711, 713

~'.alcolm

v.

Li t.tle, 295 A.2c

(1972), such statutes abrogate the common la·.v right to

expel a holdover tenant without legal ?recess:
The common lal•l rule that the landlord may expel
holdover tenants without process appears still to
be followed in several states.
That appears to
have been the ectrly rule in Delctlvare.
.State v.
Stansborouqh, 1 Del.Cas 129 and 428 (1797).
~ore rec?ntly, however, the courts of many states
have lteld that the ·-enactr:1ent of forcible entry
and detainer statutes has r:1.odified the common
la<.J and that the landlo.cd, in order t.o disp~3Sess
a tenant, must proceed by the statutes.
Failure
to proceed by such means may result in the landlord being liable to the tenant in damages.
See,
for example, Petersen v. Platt, 16 U.2d 330, 400
P . 2 d 5o 7 ( 19 6 Sl;-.i\m.rc,o'6ALR 3d 1 7 7 ( 19 6 6 ) .
The Utah Forcible Entry Statute has thus been clearly estat)
as being the exclusive alternative to consentual surrender of
leased or rented premises.

The elements and universal scope o£

the sta.tute 1vere emphasized in Free•.-rav Park Building, Inc.
States l·lholesale Supply, 22 Utah2d 266,

1

v.3J

451 P. 2d 778, 781, , 190i

1

It says that "every person" '.-Jho does certain things !
is guilty of forcible entry, etc.
There is no
exception in the statute for one who may by contract !
be authorized to enter, or for an owner who as a mat·
ter of law rnay have a right to the possession.
facts in this case clearly SU?port a finding o f
2nt:ry.

fordo:-

1

·
ase oi·
The terms of tho lease provided for re-entry lD c

default in rent payment only ~ith five days written notice .
. . . upon five

(5)

days ·11ritten notice of such dcfauit

the
Lessor
todigitization
the provided
L~~sees,
the
Lessor
shall
Sponsored by the S.J. by
Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
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I

.........

have the right to re-enter or re-possess the leased
property. . . (Ex. 11.) .
it was n~ver claimed at trial by defendant Peay that the five day
~~itten

notice was given; in fact he admitted he did not give

that notice.

(R. 237).

Thus, the repossession cannot be justified

under the terms of the lease, even if that were permitted under
the Forcible Entry Statute.
Nor can the repossession be justified by a claim of surrender
oE the lease.

There is no evidence of an express surrender, and

evidence is inadequate to support a finding of a surrender by
operation of lavl.
exists.

No tangible evidence of an intent to surrender

The defendant Peay only alleges that there was an offer

to turn over the keys to the premises by Hr. Tolman.
~re

never delivered.

Those keys

Had a surrender truly been effected, there

·,wuld have been no need to change the locks and exclude the
rightful possessors.
The standard by which a claim of surrender must be measured

in Utah was set in Mariani Air Products v. Gill's Tire Market, 29
Utah2d 291, 508 P.2d 808, 810,

(1973):

a surrender will not be implied against the intent of the parties, as manifested by their acts ...
The burden is on the party, relying on a surrender
of a lease, to prove it; and the proof must be clear
where the surrender is to be inferred from circumstances inconsistent with the intention to perform.
(Emphasis added.)
The only evidence that would support a surrender by operation

oF law was given by Peay in his statement that Tolman was going
co turn the keys over to him.

(R. 275).

However, the keys, a

:raditional emblem of surrender of a lease, were never transferred.
~hat

same part of his testimony, Peay indicated that he would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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not accept a surrender of th;_c lease when he recalled his SaJi::
to Tol:-:-.an:
... you are still on the lease and as long as we
don't have i t leased to somebody else you are responsible for th~ lease on it.
(R. 275).
Mr. Tolman's testimony shows that his intent was not to

ef~cta

surrenier, but merely to enlist Mr. Peay's help in effecting a
sale

o~

his business and an assigment of the lease.

indica~ed

Peay also

in his testimony that he v1as going to help Tolman leo::

the ?remises;
I said "All right, you take the keys and keep
them then, and as soon as you are through with
them I want you to bring them back to me so that
I can show i t when these people come to rent it.
(R. 275).
The i:-;::ent of both parties is thus ma.de clear that there

'deS:,;

surrenjer intended, and that the lease was regarded by both as·
full ::orce.
Since there 'das no consentual surrender of the premises b:·
the te:-:tan ts, the landlord's remedy is to proceed through the
forci;:;le entry and detainer statute to regain possession.
was not done.

This

Instead, Peay changed the locks on the buildi~:

and r..ade a ne1.; lease with de::endants Hall and Hostetter.

(R.;:

Peay is thus clearly guilty of a forcible entry under the sta:·::f
His actions constitute a forcible entry by stealth under the

r.::

stat'J;:e.
:::3.ses 11here dispossessior. has been eff<?cted by the cha~q:·
of

lcc~s

jurisjictions, and those

are numerous

have ;:;een found to be forcibl'" C't!tries, even under statutes
·
lacking the forclble
entry

four.::: entry

w..i_

~;

· ·
stea 1 t.h provlslon.

Call. forni-' ·

th a key or b~· a locksr.1i th to be forcible ir,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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F:

·:,i

cases.

See ::a:-:o v. i•largolis, 159 CA2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958)

and \hnchestcr v.
In the

Bec~er,

~osence

4DA 382, 88 P. 296

(1905).

of any evidence establishing consentual

s'JU2nder of the premises, noting that the provisions of the
iease for repossession were not met, it is clear that Mr. Peay's
t~ing

control of the premises was a forcible entry by stealth

•Jnder U.C.A.

§

76-36-l.

The damages following such action are easily predictable.
jithout an interest in the property, it would be practically
impossible to sell the personal property or the business itself
~r

any amount approximating the fair market value.

This is

accentnated by the difference in prices cited by Tolman at the
trial.

(R.

219).

For the above reasons, appellants believe it is obvious that
::e£enda:1t Peay forcibly entered the premises possessed by the
:Jlabtiffs and did so without legal right or justification.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF THE PL.l\INTIFFS WAS CONVERTED BY ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS.

The Utah law of conversion has been succinctly summarized in
Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958):
A conversion is an act of willful interference
with a chattel, done without lav:ful justification
by which ~he person entitled thereto is deprived
of its use and possession.
The measure of damages
of conversion is the full value of the property.
?cc , con ver.~ ion to be found,
·lth

there rnus t be a willful interference

the po:osession and use of a chattel.

~~ -2an1ng a

"~Hllful"

is defined

consciO'J.S act and 'interference' means an act so

riu•l·> that the ,,c:rty so converting may be required to,

in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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effect, purchase the goods.
The evidence Hils clec.r in this case that Pe>ay assumed contro
of the goods allegedly converted.

Peay admit ted that the equipJ'

and furnishings associated '•lith the business were still in the
buildiEg at the time he changed the locks.
Hall also testified that he understood

(R. 292).

Defendant

Peay owned the proper~

when he and Hostetter purchased the property:
t·lr. Le·.., is
t-!r. Hall

Mr. Hall

Did you purport to be purchasing that
Property?
l·;e thought that was part of the building.
(R. 243, 244).
He was selling us the property as listed
in thi.s agreement.
I don't recall if he
ca:-:•e right out in the words "I o·.vn the
rroper~y," but in the agreemeEt it said
tn::~t he •:1as selling it to us.
(;::t. 257).

Of co'.l:c·se, l·Lc. Peay' s action in changing the locks on the
building wrongfully deprived Tolman of his rightful use and
possession of the furnishings and equipment inside.

As

Tolm~

testified, i t was also impossible for him to shaH the premises tc
prospective buyers of his business.

(R.

213).

Peay further

deprived Hr. 1'olman of the use and possession of his property b,.
selling it to Hall and Hostetter.

A check dra\vn on their accou:.:

was given to Peay to cover an "equipment payment" of $200.00.
Peay
Ex.

admi~ted

receiving the payment for the equipment.

(R. 237,

l4).

Peay claims he did not knm·l of l'lr. Tolman's interest in t/>i
property at the time he 'sol6.'

i t to Hall and Hostetter and thac

as soon as he beca::1e a•.vare of his interest, he had them deal
directly ~ith the Restaurant Stores and Equipment Co.
undce:c
Uta.>-t l3.·.v, even a bo:oa :'ide c~ellcr of propsrty is guiltY
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0

p:z

As stated
?.2c: :ot: 729

i~

Allred v.

Hinc~l?v,

8 Utah2d at 76, 328

(1958):

A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer who
sells them in good faith becomes a converter since
his acts are an interference with the control of the
property or in other words, a claiming of the ownership in such property and taking it out of the
oossession of someone else with intention of excer~ising dominion over i t is a conversion.
Th~

essence of

conversio~

is the interference with the property

of another, not the state of mind of the one claiming dominion
over
0~

~~e

property.

Therefore, Hall and Hostetter are also guilty

a conversion by reason of the same transaction.
Thus a bona fide purchaser of goods for value front
one who has no right to sell the~ becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods.
~'-::.2.~., at 7 2 9 •
Conversion of the furnishings and eqGipment owned by Mr. Tolman

~as ~a~e

t;

by Peay when he interfered with Tolman's use and possession

loc~~ng

~11

him out of the building, and conversion was made by

and Hostetter when they purchased and took possession of the

?ros>ert:y in the transaction with Peay.

in

tha~

Peay's conduct was wrongful

he gained possession of the preDises and property by a

Hro~,gful

eviction.

The defendants maintained at the trial that some sort of
:Jci"·}'- denar.d is required in order to alle0e conversion.
~ell

I t is

established that no demand is necessar~ as a condition

~re~e~ent

to a suit for conversion when the original taking of

Generally, demand a~d refusal ars unnecessary when
t~~ act of tha defend~nt amoun~s to a conversion
re~~lrdless of ',lhether a demand is r.lade.
Thus, no
~ -, ~ ::nd 1 s ncce:;sar'' t.·;hen the co:1·7ersion results fran
the defDndant's se~urinq possession of the property
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No demand is necessary for the cause of action to accrue against
t1r. Peay; it accru~cl when he wroil.gfully excluded Mr. Tolman from
the leased property, and thus from his personal property.
Inasmuch as Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter \vere bona fide purch
for value, a demand is necessary for a suit to be brought

agai~

them, with a refusal on thier part.
When there has been no Hrongful taking or disposal
of the goods, and the defendant has merely come
rightfully into possession and then refused to surrender them, demand and refusal are necessary to
the existence of the tort.
William Prosser, Law
of Torts, 89.
That the required demand was made of them, and that there
was a refusal to deliver the property Has made is established
testimony at the trial.

~

(R. 107-109).

Because the defendants willfully interfered with the chattel
of the plaintiffs within the legal meaning of those terms, the
trial court erroneously denied plaintiffs' claims for conversioo.
Because the facts produced at trial, including the admissions of
the defendants, clearly show conversion, the plaintiffs are
entitled to judgment from the defendant for the fair market value
of the property, which is the proper remedy under Utah law.
POINT III
THE MvARD OF $1,2 50. 0 0 FOR DELINQUENT RENT WAS EXCESSIVE.
The terms of the lease agreement provided for payments of
$400.00 per month during the year 1975.

The monthly payment was

to increase to $450.00 for the year 1976, and, consistent wi~
that provision, a payment for last month's rent Has to become d~
on March 15, 1975.
The Lessees shall pay to the Lessor during the
original term of this lease ...
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Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) on or before the
lst d~y of January, 1975, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, and $400.00 on or before
the first day of each month thereafter during the
entire year 1975 ...
Provided further that on or before the 15th day
of March, 1975, the Lessees shall pay to the Lessor
$450.00 which shall constitute payment for the
last month's rent under the terms of this lease.
(Ex. 11.)
That the first payment for January 1975 was made is attested
to in the leQse itself.

Tolman testified at the trial that he

had made the payment, and Peay also testified that he received
that payment.
that that
The

( See Record 208, 273).

pay~ent

Febr~ary

had been made.

(R.

The trial court found
11).

payment was not made, again established by the

testimony of both Tolman and Peay.

(R. 102, 168).

The same

testimony also established that a March payment was not made.
1-!r. Toll'la:1' s liability for the March rent, however, was affected
by

Peay's actio:1s denying him access to the premises.

Evidence

established that Mr. Tolman was denied access to the premises on
March 12, 1975 by Mr. Peay, who had the locks changed.
and

Mr. Peay both agreed on this in their testimony.

216, 277).

Mr. Tolman
(R. 213,

The court's conclusion is consistent with that evidence

in fiPding the locks were changed as of that date.

Mr. Tolrna:1 is not liable for rent for the period following
his dispossession inasmuch as he was wrongfully excluded from the
premises.

It is a rule of long standing (see Hyman v. Jockey Club,

9 Colo.App.

299, 48 P. 671

(1897) that a tenant is not liable for

rent. ·-2'11c:tininc; in an une;.;pired term when there has been a ,,;rongful

eviction.
c,r:'~

for

49
/.!arc~,

~".Jur.2d

Landlord & Tenant, §§ 323, 329.

Had the

been paid, the tenant Tolman could have maintained
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an action in tort to reco,rer the pro rata rent for the unexpired
term.

Tolman should thus be liable for 12/31 of the March rent

of $400.00; or $154.80.
0!1

his counterclaim, defendant Peay was also awarded $450.oo

as the amount due on l1arch 15, 1976 as a last month's rent.

This

would be duplicative of any amount awarded for March inasmuch as
~arch

was the last month the lease was in effect.

The award of

$450.00 as a last month's rent was clearly erroneous as being
duplica~ive.

The award of that amount was also improper since

that liability did nto accrue until the 15th of l1arch, three
after the effective termination of the lease.

~%

Regardless of the

prop::::-iety of the eviction on the 12th, it is the rule that any
evictio:-~

suspends liability for rents accruing after the eviction.

49 Am.Jur2d Landlord & Tenant,

§

575.

As ahs been said by the

Colorado court:
It is well settled that termination of the lease
agreement of eviction of the tenant by the landlord relieves the tenant from all liabilities to
accrue in the future including rent ... MacArthur
v. Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo.App. 1971).
The termination of the tenant's possession relieves him of furt)s:
liabilities to the landlord if that dispossession has been ca~~
oy the landlord.

Here i t is clear and admitted that Mr. Tolman

did :1ot have access to the premises after the 12th of l'larch 1vhen
the landlord (Peay) changed the locks on the building.

There

should !"lOt be any liability for payments accruing after that
date.

The reasoning behind the rule is simply the application o'

the principle of quid pro quo.
The rule follows the general principle that any
act of the landlord which results in dispossessing
the tenant and which deprives him of the use, ocSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an eviction.
The reason for the rule is that the
rent is the landlord's right to receive from the
tenant compe~sation for the benefits that are accruing to the tenant from his possession and enjoy~ent of land, and that when the tenant is deprived
of this right of possession and enjoyment by the
action of the landlord to receive comoensation
automatically ceases.
Telegraph Ave .• Corp. v.
Raentsch, 269 P. 1109, 1112, (Cal. S. C. 1928).
It is clear that any finding that established that Mr. Tolman
was

e~cluded

from the premises as of March 12, 1975 demands that

no liability be placed on him for rents accruing after that date.
The

effect would occur if a surrender of the lease was

sa~e

Petersen v. Hodges, 239 21 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951).

four.:1.

In suDGary, liability for February, 1975, may be imposed in
the a~CJ·.ln': of $400.00.
be

For :-larch, 1975, the amount mving would

Rent is not due for the remainder fo Harch due to

5~54.80.

>lr. ?eay' s •.·.Tongful eviction of ;.:r. Tolman.
woul~

The payment which

have accrued on the 15th of March is not collectible because

the ::;a::r:1ent would duplicate the pay:nent for March rent and also
beca.lse that liability had not accrued when possession was denied
Tolrs.:~.

cm;cLus ro::.:
'::he fact of this case clearly show that the defendant Peay
was ;Jilty o£ forcible entry and that all of the defendants
conve=ted

~he

personal property of the plaitniffs.

Appellants

beL2·'·2 that the clear \·reight of the evidGnce at trial shmved the
~g~:si~e
tri·~

~acts

~OG~t

~~c::_-:.2

o:

to establish these causes of action and that the

simply er=ert in applying Utah law to the facts.
~r,e

clarit~'

of the la·.: and because the defendants'

',c~c: ='=clrl·: fit 1vithi.;1 th"' limits of the behavior prohibited by
-'.. J',-;,

a~-pcllants

that this Court reverse the trial court
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and enter judgment as previously set forth in this brief.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

fo June, 1976.

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellant!
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay,

Defend~~

Respondent, 55 East Center Street, Provo, Utah 84601; Boyd 1.
Park, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent, 80
North 100 East, Provo, Utah 84601; and Richard L. Maxfield,
Attorney for Gordon Hall and Kenneth Hostetter,
P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601, this

Defendant-Respo~c'

/tJkctay of June, 1976.
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